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Appellant/Plaintiff hereby responds Court's order for a brief on

the parties' positions regarding the Court's sua sponte call for a vote on
whether to convene an en bane rehearing ofGoogle's request for a stay of
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the panel's prior order, as amended, directing Google and YouTube to
remove all or part of a film entitled Innocence ofMuslims from its platforms
worldwide and to prevent further uploads. As directed by the Court, this
brief is limited to the issue of the stay order; it addresses the substantive
issues raised by the Court's opinion only to the extent necessary to explain
why the Court's previous denial of an emergency stay was appropriate.
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

"Dear the end is near. "

This is just one of the thousands of threats that Cindy Lee Garcia
received after her benign performance in what convicted fraudster Nakoula
Basseley Nakoula told her was an adventure film, Desert Warrior. Instead,
unbeknownst to Ms. Garcia, Nakoula used part of her Desert Warrior
performance and dubbed over another part to give the false impression that
she had called the Prophet Mohammed a "child molester" and then inserted
it, without her consent or knowledge, into a different film entitled Innocence
ofMuslims. The film was then posted on YouTube, and violent protests
broke out around the world. The anger against Ms. Garcia was particularly
intense, because although her appearance in the film was brief, Nakoula
made it appear as though she had delivered one of the film's most
inflammatory lines. She became the target of vile, gruesome, andaccording to law enforcement and court security personnel --credible
threats, of which the following are only a small sample:
"I am ready to die for MUHAMMAD (PB UH) and I would
Like to Kill all Those Who Contributed in the Shape of Acting
or Financially or any other Kind of Support in Shameless
Movie."

*

*
4

*
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"cindy lee I want to kill you. "

*

*

*

"if I find u anywhere I will fuck you deep bitch"
*

*

*

"the whole world is after you(ii)J!onna rap_e your adopted
daughter, what calamity you Jiiive brought upon thyself?"

*

*

*

"ill kill who ever have hand in insulting my prophet"

*

*

*

"Hey u bitch why u make the movie innocence ofmuslimso
Delete this movie otherwise I am the mafia don'

*

*

*

"it is my obligation that I tell you abut the true way
now
your wtsh
search on true way
death is near to you"
o o o

o o o

0

*

*

o o

*

"are u made u r dirty bitch I kill u stop the film otherwise kill

u"

In addition to these "freelance" death threats, Ms. Garcia was immediately
made the subject of an Egyptian "fatwa," a religious order of execution.
Worse yet, the media disclosed the location of Ms. Garcia's residence when
journalists camped outside her home. Soon, not only Ms. Garcia, but also
her family members and friends, received numerous threats of death and
harm, which continue to the present day. Ms. Garcia was forced to flee her
home. She cannot travel without substantial security. She has been escorted
through courthouses by armed guards, and her very presence creates such a
security risk that she has been banned from La Guardia International
5
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Airport. In short, Ms. Garcia's life has changed in ways that most people
cannot imagine, all because a convicted fraudster lied to trick her into
appearing in a film that then went "viral" on Google and YouTube's
worldwide platforms.
According to renowned Muslim scholar and counterterrorism expert
Professor Abou El Fadl, a law professor and chair of the Islamic Studies
Program at UCLA, Cindy Lee Garcia's life is forever changed, and the only
reason that she is still alive is her public battle to have her performance
taken down from Y ouTube. According to the head of security at the Los
Angeles Superior Court, even Ms. Garcia's lawyers must exercise extreme
caution, because the people who have issued the threats to Ms. Garcia, her
family, and her associates, "are very patient." Plaintiffs lead counsel was
warned that she and Ms. Garcia are in grave danger; counsel has been
advised to inform courthouse security whenever she visits the Los Angeles
Superior Court, even on unrelated matters.
After Ms. Garcia learned what had been done to her performance, she
begged Y ouTube and Google (collectively, "Google") to remove the film
from YouTube, both because the content ofthe film violates Google's

6
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official policy against exhibiting hate speech 1 or copyright infringement2 on
Y ouTube, and because she never granted Nakoula an express or implied
license to use her performance in his propaganda film. Prior to filing this
lawsuit, Ms. Garcia sent twelve separate DMCA notices asking for a
takedown of copies of the film that contained her performance. Google
refused to honor them. Even after Ms. Garcia explained the nature of her
interest and the terrible danger that she was in, Google turned a deaf ear.
Indeed, for all of Google' s professed concern about the "public interest" in
this case, not a single individual representing Google has ever expressed a
word of concern for Ms. Garcia's safety in the face of the many death threats
Y ouTube users are prohibited from uploading "material that is
copyrighted ... unlawful, obscene, defamatory, libelous, threatening,
pornographic, harassing, hateful, racially or ethnically offensive or
encourages conduct that would be considered a criminal offense ... " ER
313. According to a lawyer for Google, "We encourage free speech and
defend everyone's right to express unpopular points of view. But we don't
permit hate speech, speech which attacks or demeans a group based on race
or ethnic origin [or] religion ... " ER 317 (emphasis added).
2

Google's own attorneys have testified, in another infringement case,
that "Once Y ouTube receives a notification of alleged infringement that
substantially complies with the DMCA's requirements, we act promptly to
remove the identified material from our service or disable access to it." ER
292. In other words, YouTube failed to follow its own procedure in
connection with Garcia's takedown notices. Indeed, it appears that Y ouTube
unapologetically refuses to follow its own procedures when it is
inconvenient to do so. Perhaps this is because since its inception,
YouTube's entire advertising-supported business model has been predicated
on driving traffic to its site, even when the material contained therein
infringes on the copyrights of others.
7
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that she continues to receive solely because Google insists on continuing to
exhibit the video. Quite the opposite: Eric Schmidt, Google's chairman
responded to requests to remove the video: "We believe the answer to bad
speech is more speech ... it will stay up." ER 489, 496.
In fact, Google has behaved in a way that is indifferent at best-and
contemptuous at worst-notwithstanding the existence of the known and
credible threats to Ms. Garcia's life. For example, Google has dehumanized,
minimized, and derided Ms. Garcia's performance as, variously, "de
minimis," a mere "5 second appearance," and "minuscule," despite the fact
that she was made to appear to accuse the Prophet Mohammad of being a
child molester. 3
Fortunately, in spite of Google's attempts to demean Ms. Garcia as a
"little person" unworthy of concern, the majority opinion found that Ms.
3

Google has consistently downplayed the role that its refusal to take
down the video has played in endangering Ms. Garcia's safety and indeed,
her life. As this Court noted in its opinion reversing the district court:
It is not irrelevant that the harm Garcia complains of is death or
serious bodily harm; which the dissent fails to mention. Death
is an 'irremedial ana unfathomable' harm and bodily injury is
not far behind. To the extent the irreparable harm injut;y is at all
a close question, we think it best to err on the side of life.

(Opinion at 17 (citation omitted).) Google, on the other hand, has chosen to
"err" by posting snide messages on YouTube trivializing Ms. Garcia's
appearance in the film, completely ignoring the peril that its actions have
caused Ms. Garcia while mocking the Court in the process. Declaration of
M. Cris Armenta ("Armenta Decl."), ,-r 2, Ex. A (takedown message).
8

Case: 12-57302

03/12/2014

ID: 9013384

DktEntry: 49

Page: 14 of 47

Garcia is likely to succeed on the merits of her copyright claim. Just as
significantly, the judges on the panel took Ms. Garcia's situation seriously,
and balanced her intellectual property interests and her interest in her life
and safety over Google' s business interests. It is important to note that the
panel's opinion in this matter does not establish any new doctrine of
copyright law. Rather, as the panel acknowledged, the reason that this
situation presents a somewhat unique case is not because of the law, but
because of the facts. The long-established practice of the film industry is to
obtain either a work-for-hire agreement or a waiver and assignment of
intellectual property rights-but Nakoula completely ignored that practice,
despite this Court's prior guidance on the issue. 4 Instead, he committed
gross fraud for the purpose of obtaining Ms. Garcia's performance, thus
invalidating any implied license that she might otherwise have granted. The
Court's order, as amended, is narrowly tailored and recognizes that on these
facts, there is a clear likelihood that Ms. Garcia will prevail under the wellestablished law against copyright infringement.

4

See Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Common
sense tells us that agreements should routinely be put in writing. This simple practice
prevents misunderstandings by spelling out the terms of a deal in black and white, forces
parties to clarify their thinking and consider problems that could potentially arise, and
encourages them to take their promises seriously because it's harder to backtrack on a
written contract than on an oral one. Copyright law dovetails nicely with common sense
by requiring that a transfer of copyright ownership be in writing.").

9
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In its previous two stay requests, 5 Google trumpeted its purportedly
altruistic motive in continuing to exhibit the film: the First Amendment.
However, Google overlooks the fact that Ms. Garcia's copyright interests are
also constitutionally protected, and that the courts have long acknowledged
that there is no First Amendment right to violate copyright. Google is well
aware that Ms. Garcia has not mounted a legal challenge to Google's right to
express hatred for Islam. Ms. Garcia only complains that her copyright
interests cannot be violated in a manner that results in speech that she detests
being falsely attributed to her.
Clearly, the panel balanced the risk to Ms. Garcia's life against
Google's business interests, and chose Ms. Garcia's life. No harm will befall
Google and YouTube if they comply with the order, other than perhaps a
loss of ad revenue. The takedown order does not stifle public dialogue:
because the takedown order only affects those versions of the film that
infringe on Ms. Garcia's copyright-i.e., those versions that contain her
performance-there is nothing in the order preventing re-posting of the film
5

The Court's most recent briefing order gives Google a fifth bite at the
apple in this case: first, in its opposition brief on the merits of the appeal;
second, in its emergency stay request just prior to the issuance of the Court's
opinion; third, in its subsequent emergency stay request just after the
issuance of the Court's opinion; fourth, in its soon-to-be-filed petition to
have this entire matter reheard en bane; and fifth, in its response to the
Court's sua sponte request; of course, Google also opposed Ms. Garcia's
motion for a preliminary injunction in the district court.
10
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in a version that omits Ms. Garcia. Accordingly, the second order protects
Ms. Garcia's copyright interest while also allowing the free reproduction of
the video, albeit without the "5 seconds" of footage that Google casts as
"minuscule" when convenient.
ARGUMENT
THE TAKEDOWN ORDER SHOULD BE UPHELD PENDING THIS
COURT'S DISPOSITION OF A PETITION FOR REHEARING EN
BANC OR A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI

A.

Legal Standard
This Court has been asked to vote on whether to revisit the order

denying a stay of the takedown order. The legal standard to issue a stay
pending Google's request for an en bane hearing of this case is committed to
the Court's sound discretion. Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1203 ("A stay
is not a matter of right ... it is instead an exercise of judicial discretion ... that
is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case.") (citations
omitted). 6 Google bears the burden of showing that it is entitled to have that
discretion exercised in its favor. Id. ("The party requesting a stay bears the

After conducting a diligent but ultimately fruitless search for binding
authority on the appropriate standard of review at this procedural juncture in
this Court, Ms. Garcia agrees with Google's observation, contained in its
prior Emergency Motion for a Stay, that the law interpreting the standard for
stays pending a petition for certiorari is analogous to the instant case.
(Google's Second Motion for Stay at 5, n.l.)
6

11
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burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of this Court's
discretion.") (citation omitted). Specifically, Google must demonstrate that
it is likely to succeed on the merits, that it will be irreparably injured without
a stay, that Ms. Garcia will not be "substantially" injured by a stay, and that
the public interest lies in enabling global access to Innocence ofMuslims. 7 It
is especially unlikely that Google will be able to make such a showing
because, according to YouTube's own policies, practices and procedures, it
routinely pulls content off its platforms that consist of copyright
infringement or religious hate speech. Innocence ofMuslims happens to be
both.
For the reasons set forth below, passim, Google cannot meet its
burden to show that the circumstances of this case-which, as Google would
like the Court to forget, involve threats of death and serious bodily injury to
Ms. Garcia-justify the "intrusion into the ordinary processes of
administration and judicial review" represented by a stay. Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009). Not only is Google unlikely to succeed on the
merits, the risk of irreparable and/or substantial injury is borne exclusively
7

Requests for stays pending appeal are subject to the same analyses as
requests for preliminary injunctions. Humane Soc Y. v. Gutierrez, 558 F.3d
896, 896 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth the requirements for issuance of a stay
pending appeal and citing Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 19 (2008), which addressed the issuance of a preliminary
injunction).
12
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by Ms. Garcia, not Google. Finally, given that it is Ms. Garcia, not Google,
who is threatened with "threats of physical harm and even death" (Opinion
at 18), and that the First Amendment does not protect copyright
infringement (cf Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-220 (2003)), public
interest considerations weigh decidedly in Ms. Garcia's favor.

B.

Google Does Not Have a First Amendment Right to Violate Ms.
Garcia's Copyright
In its previous requests for a stay, Google suggested that because the

public is (morbidly) interested in Innocence ofMuslims, the company's right
to continue to profit from its exhibition is a constitutional issue. Should
Google continue to advance that argument, it would continue to be wrong.
Neither Google nor the "public" have a First Amendment interest in this
copyright dispute, and injunctive relief is entirely appropriate.
It has been established since the earliest days of our country that
freedom of expression does not include the right to infringe on the
copyrighted works-to wrongfully profit from the creative labor--of other
people. U.S. CONST., Art I, Sec. 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
Lest Google attempt to create any misunderstanding on this issue, the
Court should take heed of the Supreme Court's extremely blunt explanation
13
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of the intersection of the First Amendment and copyright law: to wit, there
is no conflict between copyright law and the First Amendment because the
Copyright Act specifically distinguishes between the expression of ideas
(which are not copyrightable and which are protected by the First
Amendment) and creative works fixed to a tangible medium (which are
copyrightable and therefore may not be infringed by third parties, even if
they really, really want to do so). See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). In that case, the Supreme

Court also explicitly observed, "copyright laws are not restrictions on
freedom of speech as copyright protects only forms of expression and not
the ideas expressed." Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556, 105 S.Ct. at 2228,
citing 1 Nimmer§ 1.10[B][2].
To the extent that Google may attempt to argue that Ms. Garcia's
copyright deserves less protection because of the public interest in the film,
Google is also wrong. The Supreme Court rejected this very argument, in a
copyright case involving a fair use defense, as follows:
It is fundamentally at odds with the scheme of copyright to

accord lesser rights in those works that are of greatest
importance to the public. Such a notion ignores the major
premise of copyright and injures author and public alike. '[T]o
propose that fair use be imposed whenever the 'social value [of
dissemination] ... outweighs any detriment to the artist,' would
be to propose depriving copyright owners of their right in the
14
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property precisely when they encounter those users who could
afford to pay for it.
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559, 105 S.Ct. at 2230, citing Gordon, Fair Use
as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax
Case and its Predecessors, 82 CoLUM.L.REv. 1600, 1615 (1982). As one
commentator has noted, "If every volume that was in the public interest
could be pirated away by a competing publisher, ... the public [soon] would
have nothing worth reading." Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A
Gathering Storm?, 19 ASCAP COPYRIGHT LAW SYMPOSIUM 43, 78 (1971).

C.

This Court's Order Is Not a "Prior Restraint."
Google has previously attacked the notion of a preliminary injunction

in this case on the grounds that it would be an unconstitutional "prior
restraint." ER 638-641. This argument, too, is unmeritorious. As an initial
matter, Ms. Garcia notes that the availability of a preliminary injunction for
copyright infringement is so well established in American law that it is
memorialized in the Copyright Act itself. See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) ("Any
court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under [the Copyright Act]
may ... grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem
reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright."). Although
the inclusion of the preliminary injunctive remedy in the Copyright Act, in
and of itself, does not definitively defeat a prior restraint argument, it is
15
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worth noting that Section 502(a), as part of the 1976 Copyright Act, was
passed against a background of well-established First Amendment law,
including the law of fair use and prior restraint, of which Congress was well
aware. Indeed, in a case that was decided several years prior to the 1976
Act, Justice Brennan noted that copyright cases are inapposite to the issue of
prior restraint because copyright cases deal with restraint of the form of
expression, not the ideas expressed. See New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713,716 n.*, 91 S.Ct. 2140,2147 n.**, 29 L.Ed.2d 822

(1971) (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v.
Penguin Books, USA, Inc., 924 F.Supp. 1559, 1575 (S.D. Cal. 1996) ("The

Supreme Court has shown no receptivity to First Amendment arguments in
the copyright context; to the contrary, it has noted that 'the Framers intended
copyright itselfto be the engine of free expression' by supplying 'the
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas."'), citing Harper &
Row, 471 U.S. at 558, 105 S.Ct. at 2229.

In addition to the statutory authorization of preliminary injunctions in
cases such as this one, the case law has rejected the "prior restraint"
argument on multiple occasions. The case of Religious Technology Center
v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc., 923 F.Supp. 1231 (N.D.

Cal. 1995), is instructive here. In that case, associates of the controversial
16
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Church of Scientology filed a copyright infringement action against an
individual who had posted materials, in which the Church held a copyright,
on the Internet. The plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction, and the
defendant argued, among other things, that a preliminary injunction would
act as a prior restraint on his right to free speech. The court decisively
rejected that argument and issued a preliminary injunction:
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Copyright Act itself
embodies a balance between the rights of copyright holders,
guaranteed by the Constitution, U.S. Const. art. I,§ 8, and the
protections of the First Amendment. See Harper & Row, 471
U.S. at 557-60, 105 S.Ct. at 2229-30; In re Capital Cities/ABC,
Inc., 918 F.2d 140, 143-44 (11 1h Cir. 1990). The doctrine offair
use already considers First Amendment concerns. New Era
Publications International, ApS v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d
576, 584 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied 493 U.S. 094, 110 S.Ct.
1168, 107 L.Ed.2d 1071 (1990) (rejecting defendant's argument
that First Amendment concerns precluded granting an
injunction, though finding other equitable considerations
dictated denial of injunctive relief). Because [the defendant] is
able to continue to criticize the Church and use its published
and unpublished works to the extent allowed by the doctrine of
fair use and because the injunctive relief sought is no broader
than necessary to protect plaintiffs' copyrights, [the
defendant's] First Amendment interests have been adequately
considered.
The same is true in this case. As noted above, Ms. Garcia has never
advanced the argument that Google or anybody else should not be permitted
to criticize Islam or to comment on this controversy. Nor has Google ever

17
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advanced a "fair use" defense. 8 Moreover, the Court's order makes it
perfectly clear that Google may criticize Islam and/or comment on the film,
and that it may host content on its platforms that contains such criticism and
comment. The Court even narrowed its original order sua sponte to make it
perfectly clear that the only thing that the order prevents Google from doing
is violating Ms. Garcia's copyright. Because the order is narrowly drawn to
cover only those postings of the film that constitute copyright infringement,
it does not fall afoul of the prior restraint doctrine. See also A&M Records,

Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting First
Amendment challenge to preliminary injunction against copyright infringer
on the grounds that "First Amendment concerns in copyright are allayed by
the presence of the fair use doctrine ... Users of copyrighted material that are
not fair uses are rightfully enjoined.") (citations omitted); Dr. Seuss

Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997)
(preliminary injunction of parody that was "likely" to infringe copyright in
children's books was not prior restraint; court characterized defendant's
prior restraint argument as a "last resort").
Finally, this Court is requested to note that Eleventh Circuit has also
considered and rejected the proposition that a preliminary injunction against
8

Because Ms. Garcia anticipates that Google may make such an argument
during this round of briefing, she preemptively addresses the issue.
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copyright infringement represents an unlawful prior restraint. 9 See, e.g., In

re Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 918 F.2d 140, 143-144 (11th Cir. 1990). In
Capitol Cities/ABC, Inc., the defendant argued that a preliminary injunction
against the broadcast of a "made-for-TV" movie that infringed plaintiffs
copyright would constitute a prior restraint. The Eleventh Circuit rejected
this argument for two reasons. First, it noted that "the Copyright Act clearly
contemplates injunctive relief to 'prevent' infringement," and cited a slew of
cases from various jurisdictions in which the federal courts have issued
preliminary injunctions to prevent infringement. 918 F.2d at 143, 143 n.9,
citing Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (directing
district court to preliminarily enjoin biography of author J.D. Salinger that
contained unauthorized copies of Salinger's protected expression),

supplemented by 818 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1987); Gilliam v. American
Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (directing district
court to preliminarily enjoin broadcast of Monty Python television program
that, as in this case, distorted the copyright holder's performance); Universal

City Studios v. Film Ventures International, 543 F.Supp. 1134 (C.D. Cal.
1982) (issuing preliminary injunction against film Great White, which court

9

Indeed, there appears to be no federal circuit court that has held that a
preliminary injunction in a copyright case ipso facto constitutes a prior
restraint.
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found substantially similar to copyrighted film Jaws); Metro-GoldwynMayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Co-Op. Productions, 479 F.Supp. 351
(N.D. Ga. 1979) (enjoining performance of musical production similar to
Gone With the Wind); Douglas International Corp. v. Baker, 335 F.Supp.
282 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (enjoining production of stage play concerning the life
of Lenny Bruce); Marvin Worth Productions v. Superior Films Corp., 319
F.Supp. 1269 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (enjoining exhibition ofbiographical film
about Lenny Bruce that infringed copyrighted materials). Second, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that an order allowing the infringer to express the
content of an infringed work (i.e., its ideas) in an alternative fashion that
"does not infringe the copyrighted owner's protected manner of expression"
would be suitably limited so as to not constitute an unlawful prior restraint.
Of course, that is exactly what happened here: the Court, after thoughtful
consideration both of the merits of the case and, apparently, the language of
its initial order, narrowed the injunction against Google so that Google
would only be enjoined against infringing Ms. Garcia's copyright. Google's
right to broadcast any other material it likes related to, consisting of, or
endorsing the ideas contained in Innocence ofMuslims is unrestricted.
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Because Ms. Garcia is Likely to Prevail on the Merits, The
Takedown Order is Appropriate, In Light of All the
Circumstances

1.

Ms. Garcia has a protectable copyright interest in her dramatic
performance.

Under the Copyright Act, dramatic works are copyrighted once they
are affixed to a tangible medium of expression. 17 U.S.C. § 101, 102(a).
Google claims that "an acting performance" is not among the list of
copyrightable works. However, this Circuit has already acknowledged that a
performer has a copyright interest in his or her contribution contained within
a copyrightable medium. See Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada,
Inc.L617 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2010) ("we think it is clear that federal

copyright law preempts a claim alleging misappropriation of one's voice
when the entirety of the allegedly misappropriated vocal performance is
contained within a copyrighted medium"); Lesley v. Spike TV, 241 Fed.
Appx. 357 (9th Cir. 2007) (acting performance copyrightable if it was created
by author and if it "possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity").
Ms. Garcia's performance easily meets this requirement, and more. As the
Court concluded in its opinion in this case, an actor must "live his part
inwardly, and then ... give to his experience and external embodiment
... that embodiment includes body language, facial expression and reactions
to other actors and elements of a scene." Opinion at 8 (citation omitted).
21
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Not only did Ms. Garcia "live" her part and deliver facial expressions,
intonation and vehemence in the anger that she portrayed in the role of a
mother protecting her daughter from an inappropriate marriage, but she even
changed the lines of the script, thus rendering her performance an even
greater expression of her own creativity. According to the Desert Warrior
script, which Ms. Garcia attached to her Complaint, see ER 25, she was to
deliver the following lines: "Are you crazy? Is your George crazy? Your
daughter has not yet reached her 13th year yet. George must be fifty-five
years old by now!" However, in the video--which is also part of the record
at ER 491-Ms. Garcia delivers a different version of the line, one that she
crafted, which states, "Our daughter is but a child, and he is fifty- five years
old!" 10
The dissent view was that Ms. Garcia cannot be an "author" for
purposes of the copyright law because as an actor, she read lines written by
others and therefore, did not engage in an act of creation. Opinion at 25.
Respectfully, however, Ms. Garcia believes that the dissent did not view nor
address the manner of her performance nor the creative changes that she
made to the script itself. See Opinion at 25.

10

This portion of Ms. Garcia's performance was not overdubbed. See ER
491.
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Even the United States Patent and Trademark Office has taken the
official position that "Under U.S. law, actors and musicians are considered
to be 'authors' of their performances[,] providing them with copyright
rights." United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), "Background
and Summary of The 2012 WIPO Audiovisual Performances Treaty," June
2012, available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/WIPO_AVP _TREATY_
FACT_SHEET.pdf. Ms. Garcia respectfully suggests that the dissent's
reasoning is not persuasive and overlooks the key differences between the
script (the creation of the purported filmmaker) and the performance that she
actually delivered. According to the annotations to the Copyright Act, the
list set forth in Section 102 as to what types of works are "copyrightable"
(e.g., literary works, works of pantomime, and so on) are illustrative in
nature. 17 U.S.C.A. § 102 Ann. (Notes ofComm. On the Judiciary, House
Report No. 94-1476) (also noting that "The copyrightable elements in a
sound recording will usually, though not always, involve 'authorship' both
on the part of the performers whose performances are captured and on the
part of the recording producer for setting it up."). In other words, when it
passed the Copyright Act, Congress specifically contemplated that both the
performer 11 and the producer would be "authors" under the Act:

11

Who can dispute that actors infuse their creativity into their gestures
23

Case: 12-57302

03/12/2014

ID: 9013384

DktEntry: 49

Page: 29 of 47

The second sentence of section 102 rthis section] lists seven
broad categories that the concept of 'works of authorship" is
said to "include." Id. "The use of the word "include," as defined
in section 10 I [section 101 of this title], makes clear that the
listing is "illustrative and not limitative," and that the seven
categories do not necessarily exhaust the scope of"original
worK.s of authorship" that ilie bill is intended to protect. Rather,
the list sets out the general area of copyrightable subject matter,
but with sufficient flexibility to free the courts from rigid or
outmoded concepts of the scope of particular categories. The
items are also overlapping in the sense that a worl< falling
within one class may encompass works coming within some or
all of the other categories. In the aggregate, the list covers all
classes of works now specified in section 5 of title 17 [former
section 5 of this title]; m addition, it specifically enumerates
"pantomimes and choreographic worl<s.

!d. Even if the dissent's view was correct and a dramatic performance that
consists of reciting lines written by another is not protected under the
Copyright Act, the record in this case shows that Ms. Garcia's performance
was more than a rote line reading. As noted above, the record has been clear
and line deliveries, such as Jack Nicholson with his signature eyebrowlifting smile, or former Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger with his announcement
that "I'll be back" in Terminator, or Clark Gable with his dismissal of
Vivian Leigh ("Frankly, my dear, I don't give a damn") at the end of Gone
With the Wind? It is not the duration of an actor's performance that defines
"authorship." The legislative history of the Copyright Act unequivocally
demonstrates the performer is an author-the next questions become
whether the performance was a "work for hire," whether the performer was
an employee and whether a sufficient license existed to transfer the rights to
the performance. In this factually extraordinary case, none of the questions
can be answered in the affirmative. This is not a case of a bit actor or an
extra objecting to editing or inclusion in a anticipated project, and it will not
result in the "parade ofhorribles" that Google claims. The reason for this is
because the vast majority of filmmakers have long used standardized
contracts providing for the transfer of performers' rights. There is nothing
untoward or offensive to the Copyright Act or the First Amendment about
protecting the reasonable expectations of the performer in this extraordinary
situation.
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since the outset of this case: although Ms. Garcia was given a script with
lines that she was to deliver, her actual performance (which, the Court is
reminded, is not the same as the mutilated version that Google is currently
exhibiting) demonstrates that Ms. Garcia in fact did exercise creative control
by rewriting her lines. Accordingly, even if the dissenting opinion's more
narrow view of the categories of copyrightable works is correct, in this case
Ms. Garcia's creative contribution renders her work clearly protectable.
2.

The length of time that Ms. Garcia appeared in the film is
irrelevant to the legal issue of her copyright interest.

Since the issuance of the Court's order, Google has chosen to ridicule
Ms. Garcia in its YouTube blocking notices as a mere actress with a "5second appearance." As noted in the introductory section of this brief, Ms.
Garcia's appearance in the video is highly relevant because, first of all, her
short appearance is the most inflammatory in the film and as Professor El
Fadl declared, "goes to the very heart" of the incendiary film as a whole. ER
251. Certainly, the individuals who threatened to gruesomely rape and
murder Ms. Garcia and her daughter did not consider Ms. Garcia to be less
culpable due to her relatively short amount of screen time.
Nor does the law condone infringement where, as here, the infringing
portion within a larger work is relatively small. "A taking [of another's
intellectual property] may not be excused merely because it is insubstantial
25
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with respect to the infringing work. As Judge Learned Hand cogently
remarked, "no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how much of his
work he did not pirate." Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F .2d
49, 56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 298 U.S. 669, 56 S. Ct. 835, 80 L.Ed. 1392
(1936).
Any suggestion that an injunction was improper, or that the panel
overstepped by ordering an immediate takedown because this matter
involves copyright, should similarly be rejected. The annals of American
law are replete with cases in which the courts have affirmed that media
outlets may properly be enjoined from infringing the copyright of others.

See, e.g., New York Times Co, 403 U.S. at 731 n.1 (White, J. and Stewart, J.,
concurring) (asserting that "no one denies" that injunctive relief is
appropriate to prevent newspapers from violating copyright); see also Arista

Records, Inc. v. Flea World, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 411, 422 (D.N.J. 2005)
(refusing to allow defendant to argue that a copyright owner's enforcement
actions had a "chilling effect" on its First Amendment rights, because "the
First Amendment is generally a protection of free speech against intrusion
by the government, not as among and between private parties"). Injunctive
relief in this or any other copyright case works no infringement at all on the
right of speakers to convey their own ideas to others, provided that they do
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not "borrow" somebody else's original performance to do so, as Nakoula
and Google did here. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. at 221, 123 S.Ct.
769 (2003) ("The First Amendment securely protects the freedom to makeor decline to make--one's own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers
assert the right to make other people's speeches."); Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F .2d 1184, 1188 (5th

Cir. 1979) ("The First Amendment is not a license to trammel on legally
recognized rights in intellectual property."); Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v.
Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1295 (D. Utah 1999)

("[T]he First Amendment does not give defendants the right to infringe on
legally recognized rights under the copyright law.").
3.

The majority applied the appropriate standard for issuance of a
prohibitory preliminary injunction (and thus, for denial of a
stay).

Ms. Garcia anticipates that Go ogle will anchor itself to the dissenting
opinion in this case and argue that in deciding to issue the preliminary
injunction (and subsequently, to deny a stay of its order), the Court should
have applied the "particularly disfavored" standard that applies to
"mandatory" preliminary injunctions. See Opinion at 19-21, citing, inter
alia, Stanley v. University ofS. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir. 1984). If

Go ogle adopts this approach, it will be wrong: under the settled law of this
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circuit, the Court's narrowly tailored relief constituted a prohibitory
injunction, not a mandatory one. See, e.g., Mehrig v. KFC Western, Inc.,
516 U.S. 479,484 (1996) (noting that a prohibitory injunction merely
"restrained" a party from further illegal conduct, where mandatory
injunction, in toxic clean-up context, required cleanup of prior toxic waste);
see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 855 (9th ed.2009) (defining "prohibitory

injunction" as an injunction that "forbids or restrains an act," and
"mandatory injunction" as an injunction that "orders an affirmative act or
mandates a specified course of conduct"), cited with approval in FTC v.
Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, the nature of the Court's

current order clearly reveals it is prohibitive in nature-it merely restrains
Google from engaging in any further infringing conduct. See, e.g., Perfect
10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp.2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (despite Google's

attempt to characterize copyright infringement injunction as mandatory,
court held that it was prohibitory, because it would require Google to cease
its allegedly infringing activities, and any active steps Google might have to
undertake to comply would merely be the means of discontinuing such
activities.), rev'd on other grounds 653 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2011). As an
initial matter, Ms. Garcia notes that the Stanley case, upon which the dissent
relied, is not a copyright-infringement case. It was an Equal Pay Act case in
28
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which the plaintiff had requested a preliminary injunction to force the
University of Southern California to install her as head women's basketball
coach, at a salary of $28,000 per year more than she had previously received
in that position.
The fact that this case involves preliminary relief for copyright
infringement, not for employment discrimination, is an important distinction,
and it is a distinction of which Go ogle is undoubtedly aware. In the case of
Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F.Supp.2d at 837, the Central District of

California held that an injunction that ordered Google to cease "allegedly
infringing activities" would be "essentially prohibitory in nature ...
Whatever active steps Google might have to undertake would merely be the
means of discontinuing acts of infringement." 12 Similarly, in this case, the
Court only ordered Google to cease and desist from further conduct that
consisted of infringing activity. Google wishes to view the order as
mandatory because Google is essentially a massive automated machine-but
copyright law is flexible enough to adapt to current technology. IfGoogle

12

Although Perfect 10 was later reversed on the grounds that the
plaintiff in that case had not shown a causal link between the infringement of
its copyright and any irreparable harm that it might have suffered, the
Central District's holding on the prohibitory nature of an injunction for
preliminary relief from copyright infringement was not disturbed. 653 F .3d
976 (9th Cir. 2011).
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was infringing by showing the film in a new theatre every night to a live
audience, it could not characterize the injunction as mandatory. The same
result applies here.
4.

Google's unauthorized use ofMs. Garcia's dramatic
performance is not a "fair use."

Ms. Garcia anticipates that Google may attempt to argue that due to
the public interest that has been excited by Innocence ofMuslims, its
continued exhibition of Ms. Garcia's performance is "fair use." 13 It is not. 14
The purpose of the fair use doctrine, which the Supreme Court has
characterized as an "equitable rule of reason," see Harper & Row, 471 U.S.
at 560, 105 S.Ct. 2218 (citations omitted), is to prevent courts from rigidly
applying the copyright laws in a way that would "stifle the creativity which
that law is designed to foster." Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 577, 114 S.Ct. 1164, 127 L.Ed.2d 500 (1994) (quoting Stewart v.
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236, 110 S.Ct. 1750, 109 L.Ed.2d 184 (1990)). The

By claiming that Ms. Garcia's performance is minuscule or de
minimis, Google appears to implicate a fair use defense. Cf Ringgold v.
Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1997) ("de
minimis might be considered relevant to the defense of fair use").
13

14

Ms. Garcia notes that fair use is an affirmative defense on which
Google bears the burden of proof. See, e.g., Morris v. Young, 925 F.Supp.2d
1078, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (characterizing fair use as an affirmative
defense on which the defendant bears the burden of proof). Because Google
has not yet filed an answer to the Complaint in this matter, it is not yet clear
whether Google intends to assert a fair use defense.
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fair use doctrine does not work to force speech by copyright holders, such as
Ms. Garcia, who may prefer not to distribute their works. See Worldwide
Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1115-

1116 (9th Cir. 2000) (copyright owner's withdrawal of copyrighted book
from distribution did not give rise to free speech considerations supporting
alleged infringer's claim of fair use, because case did not involve abuse of
the copyright owner's monopoly as an instrument to suppress facts, and
owner had right not to distribute book during term of copyright).
In addition to the law of the Ninth Circuit disallowing abuse of the
"fair use" doctrine to force unwilling copyright holders to "speak," the fair
use doctrine does not apply here for another reason: the characterization of
"fair use" as an equitable doctrine does not render it so elastic as to
encompass Google's purely proprietary use of and interest in Ms. Garcia's
performance. Under the Copyright Act, "fair use" protects only those
infringing uses made for "purposes such as criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research[.]" 17 U.S.C. § 107. There is nothing in the court
record in this case that would indicate that Google or any primary infringer
posted Ms. Garcia's performance for any of the purposes listed in section
107. Google's only true interest in posting Ms. Garcia's performance is to
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make money from advertising revenue. Google has never argued that its
mere posting of the trailer, with no accompanying critique or analysis, is the
type of creative act that the fair use doctrine typically protects.
Even if Google could show that simply postings of the performance,
copies that do not include any additional creative efforts, somehow
constituted "news reporting," 15 it still could not show fair use, because the
Y ouTube postings do not meet the statutory standard. That standard is as
follows:
In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall
include(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding
of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the
above factors.

15

See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 557, 105 S.Ct. 2218 (the promise of
copyright would be an empty one if it could be avoided merely by dubbing
the infringement a fair use "news report" of the work).
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17 U.S.C. § 107. The recent case of Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688
F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012), in which this Court held that mere publication of
photos that were "tantalizing and even newsworthy" for commercial
purposes did not constitute fair use, provides a noteworthy explanation of
the relevant statutory factors, along with certain "judicially-created
consideration[ s]."
With respect to the first factor, "purpose and character of the use," the

Monge court held that news reporting "is not sufficient itself to sustain a per
se finding of fair use." 688 F.3d at 1173. 16 To the extent that Google simply
relies on the "reporting" factor of the Copyright Act, then, that alone cannot

The 1961 Report of the Register of Copyrights on General Revision of
the US. Copyright Law cites examples of activities that courts have regarded
as fair use:
16

quotation of excerpts in a review or criticism for purposes of
illustration of commentary; quotation of short passages in a
scholarly or technical work for illustration or clarification of the
author's observations; use in a parody of some of the content of
the work parodied; summary of an address or article, with brief
quotations, in a news report; reproduction by a library of a
portion of a work to replace part of a damaged copy;
reproduction by a teacher or student of a small part of a work to
illustrate a lesson; reproduction of a work in legislative or
judicial proceedings or reports' incidental and fortuitous
reproduction, in a newsreel or broadcast, of a work located in
the scene of an event being reported.

Innocence ofMuslims is none of these things; and Google can hardly argue
that it has not commercially exploited its own sites and the increased traffic
to its platforms that has resulted from its hosting of Innocence ofMuslims.
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justify a fair use finding. On the related issue of the "judicially-created
consideration" of whether a report is "transformative," the court noted that
"mere rebroadcast [is] not in itselftransformative." !d. at 1174, citing L.A.

News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l., 149 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 1998);
L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channe/9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir.
1997). That, of course, is exactly what Google did in this case: it merely
rebroadcast the film. There is nothing about the postings of Innocence of

Muslims that constitute any "comment[] on [Ms. Garcia's] work." Monge,
688 F.3d at 1175. Instead, it was a purely commercial venture, which the
Supreme Court has held is "presumptively an unfair exploitation of the
monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright" and that
"tends to weigh against a finding of fair use." !d. at 1176, citing Sony, 464
U.S. at 451, 104 S.Ct. 774; and Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562, 105 S.Ct.
2218. Accordingly, the postings do not qualify for fair use protection as a
news report.
With respect to the second factor, the "nature of the copyrighted
work," the court looks to whether the copyright work is creative and whether
or not it has been published. Monge, 688 F.3d 1164. Here, because-as
explained in the panel's opinion-Ms. Garcia imbued her performance with
the substantial creativity required to "live" a character, her work was indeed
34
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creative. Moreover, as set forth above, Ms. Garcia contributed additional
creativity to her performance when she rewrote certain portions of her
dialogue and delivered those lines rather than the ones that were in the script
provided to her. In addition, it is undisputed that Ms. Garcia's work was
"published"-it was affixed to the medium of film. Accordingly, the second
factor weighs against fair use.
The third factor is the "amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole." This factor, too, weighs in
Ms. Garcia's favor. In a case from the Second Circuit that is notable for
holding that a much less consequential infringement than that involved in
this case was not de minimis, the court determined that the use of a
copyrighted poster for a total of27 seconds in the background ofthe TV
show Roc was not de minimis. The court held that poster was clearly visible
and recognizable with sufficient observable detail for the "average lay
observer" to view the artist's imagery and colorful style. Ringgold v. Black

Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997) ("The legal
maxim 'de minimis non curat lex' (sometimes rendered, 'the law does not
concern itself with trifles') insulates from liability those who cause
insignificant violations of the rights of others."). Because Ms. Garcia's
performance, although it was brief, goes to "the very heart of' the incendiary
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message in Innocence ofMuslims, the use of her performance is hardly
insignificant. Her performance is readily identifiable, given that media
camped out in front of her house after the video went "viral." And, one
needs only look to the effects that her performance has had-forcing her to
go into hiding, to move, and to be subjected to gruesome threats and a fatwa
for her execution-to see that the relationship between her appearance in the
film and the film as a whole is substantial indeed.
Finally, the Court should look to the effect of the use on the potential
market for Ms. Garcia's work. In the Ninth Circuit, the likelihood of market
harm may be "presumed" when the intended use is, as in this case, for
commercial gain, although that presumption is not rigidly applied in every
case. See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publishing, 512 F.3d 522, 531 (91h
Cir. 2008) (so holding), cited in Monge, 688 F.3d at 1181 (determining
market harm "in the first instance" on the grounds that the Supreme Court
has admonished against presumptions related to the fourth fair use factor).
Undoubtedly Google will argue that there is no market effect in this case,
because Ms. Garcia is a new and obscure actress. However, market effect is
not measured by the fame of the copyright holder. Rather, the Supreme
Court has held that the market impact factor implicates the author's right to
decide "whether and in what form to release his work." !d. at 1182, citing
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Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 553, 105 S.Ct. 2218. As the Monge court noted,

there is no telling what the future may bring. In that case, the court reasoned
that the copyright holders might later change their minds about selling the
photographs at the heart of that case, which were unauthorized photographs
of their wedding. In this case, Ms. Garcia's notoriety may well create a
market for her performance that might not have existed before. Either way,
it is up to Ms. Garcia-not Google-to make the decision about whether or
not to exploit her performance, at least during the term of her copyright.
Accordingly, the "effect on the market" factor does not weigh in Google's
favor.
5.

It was entirely proper for the Court to issue a preliminary
injunction where, as here, Ms. Garcia showed a "likelihood" of
success: a conclusive finding of liability is neither required nor
appropriate.

Google has suggested, in its two earlier motions for a stay of the
Court's order, that a preliminary injunction is improper because the Court
did not hold that Ms. Garcia is certain to win her case. Specifically, Google
argued that this case is "doubtful"-and therefore that injunctive relief is
inappropriate-because the Court's opinion contained the term "fairly
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debatable." 17
As an initial matter, Ms. Garcia notes that because this case came
before the Court on the denial of a preliminary injunction, there is nothing
inappropriate about acknowledging the possibility that Ms. Garcia may not
ultimately prevail. Certainty ofsuccess is not the standard for issuance of a
preliminary injunction: the standard is whether a copyright plaintiff makes a
clear showing, see Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. v. WTV Systems, Inc.,
824 F.Supp.2d 1003, 1008 (C.D. Cal. 2011), of a likelihood of success. See,

e.g., Idaho State University Faculty Ass 'n. v. Idaho State University, 857
F.Supp.2d 1055, 1057 n.1 (D. ld. 2012) (in case involving challenge to email
restrictions, holding that preliminary injunctions are issued on a showing of
"likelihood" of success; there is no final resolution at the preliminary
injunction stage); Kelly v. Gilbert, 437 F.Supp. 201, 204 (D. Mont. 1976) (in
case involving challenge to compelled appearance before grand jury, holding
that "it is not necessary to show the absolute certainty of success for
issuance of the preliminary injunction."). Indeed, not only would it have
been inappropriate for the panel to "raise the bar" with respect to the legal
standard (which is what Google seems to request), but given that the

Although Google repeats this phrase seven times in its brief(Google's
Second Emergency Motion for Stay at 1, 4, 7, 10), in fact, the Court's
opinion only uses it once.
17
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appellate court does not play the role of a factfinder, it would have been
inappropriate for the Court to have opined with certainty as to the ultimate
disposition of this case by the district court.
At any rate, the Court should be aware that Go ogle's characterization
of the panel's opinion as being somehow equivocal on the likelihood of
success issue, which is based entirely on the appearance of the two-word
phrase "fairly debatable" once in the 18-page opinion, is misleading at best.
According to Google, the appearance of those two words (in an opinion of
more than 18 pages) shows that the facts and the law are not really in Ms.
Garcia's favor and indeed, that those two little words render her entire case
"doubtful." (Google's Second Motion for Emergency Stay at 7.) What
Google does not fairly discuss, however, is the context of the supposedly
dispositive phrase. Here is what the Court actually said:
We need not and do not decide whether every actor has a
copyright in his performance within a movie. It suffices for
now to hold that, while the matter is fairly debatable, Garcia is
likely to prevail.
(Opinion at 10.) When one reads the entire sentence, along with the
preceding sentence, it becomes clear that the Court was saying that "whether
every actor has a copyright in his performance within a movie" is "fairly
debatable," but that in this case-which is the only one being litigated
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18
today-the likely outcome is clear. Accordingly, Park Village Apartment

Tenants Ass 'n. v. Mortimer Howard Trust, 636 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2011), the
case that Google has previously cited for the proposition that any uncertainty
as to a case's ultimate outcome bars the issuance of a preliminary injunction,
1'teabl e. 19
.
. mapp
Is

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court
DECLINE to rehear en bane the Court's order ofFebruary 28, 2014,
denying a stay of the Court's prior orders, as amended, directing Google and

Ms. Garcia notes that Google has misunderstood the standard of
review that the Court was required to apply in reviewing the district court's
ruling. In its second stay motion, Google argued that because the Court
uttered the words "fairly debatable" (an argument that itself is founded on a
reading comprehension failure), it was prohibited from overturning the
district court, because the proper standard of review was "abuse of
discretion". (Google's Second Motion for Stay at 7.) Google cites no
authority for this proposition, but that is of no matter. Not only is Google
wrong for having misread the Court's opinion, it is wrong about the standard
of review that bound the panel, which with respect to questions of law, was
actually a de novo standard. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F .3d
091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002) (cited in Opinion at 5.)
18

19

Park Village is a case that is factually very different than this one. In
Park Village, unlike here, the plaintiffs "have not made any showing that
they are likely to be harmed" by the defendants' conduct. 636 F.3d at 116061. Google, along with the rest of the world, knows full well that that is not
the case. In the words of the Court, "death is an irremediable and
unfathomable harm, and bodily injury is not far behind." (Opinion at 17,
citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986).)
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Y ouTube to remove immediately all or part of the film entitled Innocence of

Muslims from its platforms worldwide and to prevent further uploads.
Respectfully submitted,

Dated: March 12, 2014

Is/ M. Cris Armenta- - -

M. Cris Armenta
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